CYB-29 · Cyber security
BEC prevention controls — dual-authorisation for payments; verbal verification protocol for changed banking details
Business Email Compromise is the number-one financial fraud vector against SA insurance brokers. Attackers compromise email, then impersonate the broker to redirect premium payments or claims settlements. The most effective preventive control is a verbal verification protocol: any change to banking details must be confirmed via a known phone number — never via email alone.
Trigger
When this rule fires
No verbal verification protocol for changed banking details; no dual-authorisation requirement for outgoing payments above a defined threshold; staff unaware of BEC risk pattern
Applicability gate
Confirm the entity's role before treating this as a duty
This is a readiness rule mapped to JS2 themes. Its presence in the library does not establish that JS2 applies directly to the firm.
- Insurance Broker: Most independent non-life Category I brokers are not directly in JS2's defined scope. A broker may be directly in scope if it separately meets a listed category, and may face contract or oversight requirements from an in-scope institution. Third-party provisions impose duties on the in-scope financial institution. They do not themselves make every supplier or intermediary directly subject to JS2.
- Uma Binder Holder: UMA or binder-holder status is not itself listed in JS2's definition. Direct scope depends on another listed capacity; insurer contracts and oversight may create evidence requirements. JS2 paragraph 3.3 concerns juristic persons structured under an insurer or designated insurance group; it is not a blanket rule for every independent UMA or intermediary.
- Insurer: An insurer as defined in the Insurance Act is directly in scope of JS2 from 1 June 2025. Apply proportionality and distinguish the insurer's own duty from requirements it places on third parties.
Citation
Mapped source
This control maps to the public instruments below. The mapping does not establish entity applicability.
- Section
- Joint Standard 2 of 2024 / SAIA CSIRT BEC advisory
- Legislation
-
- Joint Standard 2 of 2024
- FAIS Act risk management
Remediation
How to close the gap
Implement a written policy: all changes to banking details must be verified via a known, pre-existing phone number. No banking detail changes actioned via email alone. Dual authorisation required for all outgoing payments >R10,000. Include BEC scenario in annual tabletop exercise.
Evidence required
Evidence to prepare if this control applies
- BEC prevention policy document
- Payment authorisation matrix (dual-auth thresholds)
- Staff training record covering BEC
- Incident log showing BEC attempts (with outcome)